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Review Essay

Saints and Sinners: On Gandhi's Lawyers
and Touts
John A. Flood
J. S. GANDHI, Lawyers and Touts: A Study in the Sociology of the Legal Profession. New Delhi: Hindustan Publishing, 1982 (U.S. distributor, Humanities
Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.). Pp. 174. $14.50.
Law and medicine are two things we Indians have always shone at ....
-Paul Scott, The Jewel in the Crown

Background
We know from work on early county courts that by the twelfth and thir-

teenth centuries there was a solidly established class of professional lawyers
in England,' although they were pleaders and attorneys rather than barristers
and solicitors.2 By the fifteenth century there were at least six categories of
lawyers that, by the eighteenth century, were consolidated into two. 3 It is
these two groups-barristers and solicitors-who were exported to the col-

onies to provide the backbone not only of their legal professions, but also of
their judicial and administrative personnel. 4 Except in India, most emigrant

lawyers were barristers.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the condition of the

English bar was at best precarious, for the bar had grown dramatically in this

John A. Flood is a Research Associate, American Bar Foundation. LL.B. 1975, London School of Economics; LL.M. 1978, University of Warwick; LL.M. 1980, Yale Law School.
1. To assist the reader who might find the multiplicity of terms for the category lawyer somewhat perplexing, I include a glossary in the appendix that should prevent the historical and cultural patterns from
unraveling and becoming tangled.
2. See Robert C. Palmer, The Origins of the Legal Profession in England, 11 Irish Jurist 129 (1976); id.,
The County Courts of Medieval England, 1150-1350 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
Palmer notes that although there was a division of function between pleader and attorney, no one was precluded from occupying both roles simultaneously.
3. See J. H. Baker, The English Legal Profession, 1450-1550, in Wilfrid Prest, ed., Lawyers in Early
Modem Europe and America 16 (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1981); C. W. Brooks, The
Common Lawyers in England, c. 1558-1642, in id. at42; Wilfrid Prest, The English Bar, 1550-1700, in id.
at 65.
4. See Daniel Duman, The English and Colonial Bars in the Nineteenth Century (London: Croom
Helm, 1983).
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period. As barristers came to rely more and more on solicitors to supply them
with business and less on contacting lay clients directly, establishing a practice without the aid of family, business, or solicitor connections became increasingly risky. Hence, setting up a practice in the colonies, while certainly
not the ideal career direction, was a lucrative alternative that held the prospect of fairly rapid judicial advancement. Generally, the colonies provided a
means of both siphoning off the excess lawyers in Great Britain and exporting the basic elements of a legal system to alien cultures. The most avidly
sought after colony was India. India was different from the others; it was the
"Jewel in the Crown of the British Empire." It promised tremendous rewards-one barrister in the early nineteenth century retired with £60,000
after four years of practice-to those prepared to withstand the heat, the
monsoon, and the diseases. Consequently, India was the first colony to reach
saturation point in its lawyer population.
The present legal profession in India is an amalgam of domestic and imported elements. Gandhi's Lawyers and Touts examines one segment of the
bar-that practicing in the district courts of Gobindgarh in the Punjab.6
However, in order to evaluate Gandhi's study fully, I will cover some aspects
of the legal profession's history in India.
Although India had an indigenous legal culture before the English arrived,
the present system stems from that initial colonization by the East India
Company. The Company was at first averse to lawyers' practicing in India; it
saw them as "stirring up ...strife and contention." 7 This attitude reflected
the nadir to which the legal profession had sunk in England during the seventeenth century. Indeed in the third quarter of that century most "lawyers" in
India were not trained in law; they were businessmen, clerics, or Company
servants. With the establishment of the mayor's courts in Calcutta and
Madras in 1726, the legal profession began to grow and to assert some independence from the Company. The first cohort of lawyers were mainly attorneys rather than barristers, but this complexion changed when the first supreme court was established in Calcutta in 1774.8
The first barristers came to India as judges rather than as advocates. As the
prestige of the legal profession rose in line with that of the supreme court,
more barristers arrived from Great Britain, and the attorneys stopped practicing as advocates in favor of practicing as solicitors. In 1793 William
Hickey reported that there were 9 barristers, including the attorney general,
in Calcutta.9 For the period 1790 to 1809, there were 17 barristers and 15 at-

5. Samuel Schmitthener, A Sketch of the Development of the Legal Profession in India, 3 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 337, 345 (1968-69).
6. Gobindgarh is a fictitious name (at 1 n.1). See also infra note 48.
7. P. B. Vachha, Famous Judges, Lawyers, and Cases of Bombay 8, quoted in Schmitthener, supra
note 5, at 339.
8. Schmitthener, supra note 5,at 343.
9. 3 A. Spencer, Memoirs of William Hickey 149, cited in Schmitthener, supra note 5, at 345.
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torneys and solicitors.'" By 1861 Calcutta had 32 barristers and 60 attorneys,
or solicitors; 4 of the attorneys were Indian. 1 The courts in the presidency
towns of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta were for many years the preserves
of the British lawyer;I 2 Indian lawyers instead concentrated their practices in
the mofussil courts (countryside courts run by the Company).
The fees earned by the new bar were enormous. Schmitthener quotes the
1844 Indian Law Commissioners' Report as saying "the rate of bar fees [is]
two, three-five times what it is in England." ' I But then trade and investment
were also vigorous at this time; the cost of law merely followed suit.
By 1858 the British government controlled India directly. The morass of
courts was unified into a single coherent system in each of the presidency
towns. For the first time Indian and British practitioners were put on an ostensibly equal footing. The composition of the high court bench was onethird British barristers, one-third judicial members of the Indian Civil Service, and the final third lower judiciary and Indian lawyers practicing before
the high court. ' The high courts were given authority to make rules regarding qualifications of advocates, vakils (Indian-trained advocates), and attorneys.
Vakils faced opposition from advocates in the high courts of the presidency towns. Since vakils were on ostensibly equal footing with barristers, they
could practice on both the original and appellate sides of the high courts. The
jurisdiction of the original side encompassed major civil and criminal matters, and practice on it granted large rewards. The appellate side was not
nearly so lucrative; hence the English advocates never objected to Indians'
appearing there. Even those Indians who had traveled to England to read for
the bar and become barristers (as opposed to vakils) met considerable prejudice from English and Indian solicitors alike. Indian advocates, whether
barristers or vakils, were considered too great a risk for the lucrative commercial cases of the original side, for surely, lawyers and litigants reasoned,
the English barrister would always win."I Eventually vakils won the right to
practice without hindrance on both sides in all high courts and were gradually absorbed into the bar. 6 It was not until the postindependence period that
legislation was enacted to merge the plethora of practitioner grades into
one-namely advocate, with no division of functions as between barristers
and solicitors.' 7

10. Id.
11. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times 327, quoted in Schmitthener,
supra note 5, at 345.
12. The presidency towns were the key administrative areas of the Company. See V. D. Kulshreshtha,
Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History ch. 2 (4th ed. Lucknow, India: Eastern Book Co.,

1977).
13. Schmitthener, supra note 5, at 346, quotingfrom 6 Calcutta Rev. 530 (1846).

14. Id. at 356.
15. Id. at 367.
16. Kulshreshtha, supra note 12, at 417.
17. The Advocates Act of 1961, see Schmitthener, supra note 5, at 360.
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The choice of the term advocate tells us something most important about
Indian lawyers. As Galanter notes, "Public and profession in India concur in
visualizing the lawyer in the role of courtroom advocate, rather than business
adviser or negotiator, much less social planner."" The studies we have of Indian lawyers by Gandhi and others (e.g., Kidder and Morrison) 9 reinforce
this perspective. We do not, for example, have research on the role of Indian
lawyers in corporate planning; but indeed data on the Indian legal profession
as a whole are skimpy. The 1971 Indian Census provides figures on the lawyer population,2" but there is some confusion with the terminology involved.
Lawyers as a discrete category number 90,906; if we add the group termed
jurists(i.e., court officials), the figure rises to 238,658. However counted, the
Indian legal profession is a large one, second in size only to that of the United
States.
Gobindgarh District Courts
The setting for Gandhi's study is a district near the Indo-Pakistani border
in the Punjab. The Punjab-before the 1947 independence divided it into Indian and Pakistani territories-embraced a mixture of Hindus (including
Sikhs) and Muslims. Currently the Punjab is the stronghold of Sikhism, with
its center in Amritsar, a holy city for Sikhs. 2 They are considered among the
most industrious and sophisticated members of the Indian labor force.
The district court represents the bottom tier of the courts' hierarchy. The
middle level is occupied by the high court, the court of appeal for the state,
and the top, by the Supreme Court of India. Gandhi selected the district
court for his study because he believed that he could better "identify some of
the more basic and fundamental processes of professional practice at the
level of district courts than at either of the other two higher levels" (at 3). He
was also acquainted with some of the lawyers practicing there.
In chapters 5 and 6 Gandhi describes and analyzes, in some detail, the
social structure and types of practice of the Gobindgarh district court bar. Of
203 lawyers, Gandhi identified 154 as regularly practicing advocates (at 61).
His sample is predominantly young, 42% are between 21 and 35 years of age
(at 62). Here once again, students of the Indian legal profession will be frustrated by the sheer lack of data. There is no way of telling whether the
Gobindgarh district court bar is typical. Obviously the New Delhi bar would
be larger, if not the largest; but what of other provincial centers, such as
Madras or Bangalore or Calcutta? No data exist. Thus it is difficult to extrapolate from Gandhi's findings.
18. Marc Galanter, Introduction: The Study of the Indian Legal Profession, 3 Law & Soc'y Rev. 201,
207 (1968-69).
19. Robert L. Kidder, Formal Litigation and Professional Insecurity: Legal Entrepreneurship in South
India, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 11 (1974); Charles Morrison, Munshis and Their Masters: The Organization of
an Occupational Relationship in the Indian Legal System, 31 J. Asian Stud. 309 (1972); id., Clerks and
Clients: Paraprofessional Roles and Cultural Identities in Indian Litigation, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 39 (1974).
20. Central Statistical Office, 1 Census of India 12-13, series 1, pt. 26(4) (New Delhi, 1971).
21. Sikhism is a noncaste religion founded in the fifteenth century in a schism from Hinduism. See
Gopal Singh, A History of the Sikh People, 1469-1978 (New Delhi: World Sikh University Press, 1979).
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Particular to India, of course, is the concept of caste, and Gandhi breaks
down the bar according to caste membership. 22 Two-thirds of the bar is composed of the three castes that effectively control the financial and business affairs of the Punjab (at 63). The Jat Sikhs, a subgroup of the Sikhs, form 20%
of the bar; they are the main landowning contingent in the state. In all, the
Sikhs constitute about 30% of the district bar (at 64). With the exception of
the Jat Sikhs, who are a rural-based group, the other castes have urban backgrounds. It is interesting to compare Indian lawyers' backgrounds with those
of their closest analogue, the British bar. Roughly 70% of the Indian district
lawyers had fathers in business, farming, or law-related occupations (at 70).
The Royal Commission on Legal Services Final Report found that more than
half of those entering the legal profession also had fathers in professional or
managerial occupations.2 3
In the nineteenth century an Indian wishing to compete with an English
barrister on near equal terms had to travel to England and join one of the
Inns of Court to qualify. Law colleges granting LL.B. degrees were established in India by the mid-nineteenth century, but their graduates were held
in lower esteem than barristers even though the Indian LL.B. examinations
were often more difficult than the English equivalent examinations. In
modern times all advocates must have law degrees. The law department of
Punjab University at Chandigarh, the state capital of the Punjab, is one of
the more prestigious institutions of its kind. 24 Gandhi found that 86 (56%)
members of his sample obtained their law degrees there (at 66).25 Broadly
speaking, then, the Gobindgarh bar is an urban-based, well-educated,
bourgeois institution. In these respects it does not differ from its erstwhile
stepmother, the English bar.
In actual practice, too, the Gobindgarh bar has borrowed from the English
system. Though Gandhi does not address the issue directly, as barristers in
the British system, all Indian lawyers work as solo practitioners. This has an
immense impact on the development of a career. Indian lawyers do not even
have the buttress of the chambers system to help them in their early stages.26

22. See, e.g., Max Weber, Caste Taboo, Vocational Caste Ethics, and Capitalism, in 2 id., Economy

and Society, ed. Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, and trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. 435 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978); also Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward

Classes in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
23. The Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report: Surveys and Studies, Cmnd. No. 7648-1,
at 59 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979).
24. Preface to N. R. Madhava Menon, Legal Education in India: Status and Problems 13 (New Delhi:
Bar Council of India Trust, 1983).
25. The LL.B. degree runs the usual gamut of courses, e.g., torts, procedure, business law, and legal
ethics. See Paras Diwan, State of Legal Education in Punjab and Chandigarh, in Menon, supranote 24, at
64-65. But as Gandhi notes, the ethical standards of the Gobindgarh bar are abysmally low. I will return to
this topic below.
26. Chambers are suites of offices shared by barristers who come together to share expenses but not
fees. See I The Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report, Cmnd. 7648, at 446 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979); John A. Flood, Barristers' Clerks: The Law's Middlemen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).
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Gandhi separates a total of 155 advocates into four groups: 12 exclusive
lawyers, 111 semiexclusive lawyers, 23 nonexclusive lawyers, and 9 satellite
lawyers. The continuum of exclusivity refers to the lawyers' areas of specialization, or lack thereof, and the level of success they have attained. Gandhi
distinguishes three areas of specialization, namely, criminal, civil, and
revenue. To Western eyes the odd category is revenue; it includes "such litigation as relates to any one or more of the juridicial aspects of agricultural
land or such land as is charged land revenue" (at 75). It is part of civil practice and is governed by the Indian Civil Procedure Code, but it deals exclusively with rural matters. The exclusive lawyers, therefore, concentrate mainly in one area of practice-to what extent we do not know.2 7 The semiexclusives have a major field (e.g., criminal) combined with a minor (e.g.,
revenue). The nonexclusive group takes whatever work it can find.
Many of the differences among the three groups can be explained by age.
The most successful group, the exclusive lawyers, have generally been in
practice longer than the others-a minimum of three decades. All but one
were over 60 years of age (at 83). Sixty-six percent of the semiexclusive group
were between 33 and 48 years of age (at 91). And the great majority of the
nonexclusives (74%) were below 31 years of age (at 94).28
A short digression on Gandhi's figures is in order here. His sample is 154
lawyers; about this he is quite specific (at 4). In chapter 6, however, his
figures are completely awry. From his tables, the inescapable conclusion is
that there are 155 lawyers in his sample, and I can find no explanation for this
discrepancy. This is further confounded because in the text (at 93), he refers
to 31 lawyers in the nonexclusive category but in table 33 (at 94), he refers to
23. If 31 were the correct number, Gandhi's grand total should be 163. While
these errors do not, I believe, affect the substantive conclusions of his study,
they are unfortunate examples of slipshod scholarship and poor editing.29
Lawyers and Clients
Perhaps the most interesting issue, and certainly one that enlivens
Gandhi's study, is his discussion of lawyer-client relations and the dynamics
of practice. Despite the litigious complexion of practice in India,30 relationships with clients do not appear enduring, rather they are ephemeral, one-

27. Cf. John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar
43-53 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, and Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1983). They explored the amounts of time practitioners devoted to particular fields of law (25 fields identified) by placing
them in three categories: those that spent 5% to 25% of their time in their field, those that spent 25% to
50% of their time, and those that devoted over 50% of their time to a field.
28. No data are supplied for the satellites.
29. The monograph contains more defects of a similar nature. Gandhi has a tendency to quote or to cite
writers, then not list them in his bibliography. I counted at least 13 such lapses, besides sundry misspellings
of authors' names or absences of references where they are needed.
30. For example, Gandhi notes that although the Punjab has only 2.4% of the country's total popula-

tion, it has 4.5% of the country's civil litigation (at 55).
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shot affairs, unlike much of American legal practice. 3 ' Kidder, in his study of
courts in Bangalore, South India, argued that the lawyer-client relationship is
marked by an unusually high degree of mutual mistrust.12 Each side attempts
to exploit the other to its personal advantage. For Gandhi the equation is not
so balanced; it is the lawyers (and the more practiced lawyers at that) who
plunder clients and younger lawyers (at 156). He uses strong language. For
example: "An awareness has been generated about the imperative necessity
of inserting some remedial measures to stem the 'rot' and stench besetting the
Bar" (at 156).
The relationship between lawyer and client can often only begin with an intermediary, especially a tout, whose task it is to solicit clients for lawyers.
First, much of a lawyer's clientele is fragmented, spread throughout rural
areas. All revenue cases derive from rural clients, as do a large number of
criminal cases. Second, virtually the only way a novice lawyer can generate a
practice is by using a tout. On this topic there is some disagreement among
Gandhi, Kidder, and Morrison. According to Gandhi, a tout's only reward is
monetary. A tout receives up to 30% of the lawyer's fee (at 113)."1 No commission is paid by the client. The commission, or touty, is paid whether the
tout is a kinsman, former colleague, or stranger. Morrison, in his research on
a district legal profession in Haryana (the state next to Punjab) argues that
there are other rewards for touts, such as receiving political patronage or
stacking up favors for the future. 4 Touts must be understood in the context,
Morrison says, of "intermediation [as] an important element in Indian social
life, where direct confrontation other than among kinsmen is felt to be inappropriate or inauspicious-even where it is otherwise quite possible.""
Whatever the reward the tout receives from the lawyers, the client is often
unaware of being part of a bargain. Touts present themselves as friends and
helpers and strike an empathetic chord with potential clients. At no time during the transaction should the client be aware of being manipulated. Whereas
Gandhi poses the client as an innocent dupe in a devious game,' 6 Morrison
disputes his view. To him, although village life may appear closed (and it is
on matters of rights and status) it is not as to knowledge of the external
world. Villagers are not gullible innocents in the context of the courts; they
accept litigation as a naturally occurring aspect of everyday life. 3 7 Kidder articulates a similar view of clients as knowledgeable. 8
31. Cf. the lists of clients of law firms in The American Lawyer Guide to Law Firms, 1983-84 (New
York: Am-Law Publishing, 1983); and see James B. Stewart, The Partners: Inside America's Most

Powerful Law Firms (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).
32. Kidder, supra note 19, at 22.
33. Cf. Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962), and Kenneth J. Reichstein, Ambulance Chasing: A
Case Study of Deviation and Control Within the Legal Profession, 13 Soc. Probs. 3 (1965).
34. Morrison, Clerks and Clients, supra note 19, at 47.

35. Id.
36. Cf., e.g., Pat Carlen, Magistrates' Courts: A Game Theoretic Analysis, 23 Soc. Rev. (n.s.) 347
(1975); id., Magistrates' Justice (London: Martin Robertson, 1976).
37. Morrison, Clerks and Clients, supra note 19, at 50-51.
38. Kidder, supra note 19, at 23.
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Despite the prominent role of touts, Gandhi argues strongly that kinship
networks are the primary structural feature in developing a lawyer's career.
Most successful lawyers in his sample depended on this type of connection (at
129 table 38). Those who failed to build viable careers at the bar had no kinship networks to exploit (at 130-134).
One other actor in the unfolding drama of legal practice is the munshi,
who occupies a cluster of roles; among them are clerking, bookkeeping, tutoring clients and witnesses, and generating business. Frequently, according
to both Gandhi and Morrison, the same person is both a tout and a munshi.
One of Gandhi's exclusive lawyers puts it thus:
I make no secret of the fact that I have rarely employed a munshiwithout considering his utility in bringing business... All of them have mattered so much
for my success. At the same time, they have always had their due from me. 'H'
had been very useful to me as a munshi. He has been with me for the last eighteen years. He is an important man in and around his native village and has
brought me scores of cases from his friends and acquaintances... They all
trust him. (At 141).
Again, this relationship between lawyer and munshi is often characterized by
mutual mistrust.3 9 Munshis like to attach themselves to rising or well-established lawyers; a lawyer in a decline is likely to be without a munshi.Munshis
can receive between 10 and 33 % of a lawyer's earnings, depending on whether they are touting, which leads to the higher commission, or doing their
other tasks, which leads to lower rates (at 145). The best have long experience
and are preferably aged between 50 and 70 years (at 143).
The closest analogues in the West to the munshi are barristers' and solicitors' clerks. 0 In England and Wales no barrister may practice without a
clerk, and few barristers can start careers without the active support of their
clerks. Clerks schedule cases, negotiate fees, nursemaid barristers, and generate business. As lay clients do not come to barristers directly, clerks have to
find ways of persuading, or touting, solicitors to send business to their
chambers. They must display a combination of management and entrepreneurial skills, for which they receive up to 10% of their barristers' fees. In
the field of litigation it is generally the solicitors' clerks, or legal executives,
who deal directly with the lay clients. And it is generally they who choose the
barrister for the case. Normally, solicitors' clerks are on a salary and, unlike
either barristers' clerks or munshis, they have some legal training. Both barristers' and solicitors' clerks are indispensable to the development of their
principals' careers.

39. Morrison articles, supra note 19.
40. See I The Royal Commission on Legal Services, supra note 26, at 406, 482; Quintin Johnstone &
John A. Flood, Paralegals in English and American Law Offices, 2 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 152
(1982); and Flood, supra note 26.
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Legal Ethics
In the context of the recent adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct by the American Bar Association,41 Gandhi's study raises interesting problems of ethics and professional responsibility. One can ask if, given
the circumstances of practice for Indian lawyers, it is possible for them to be
ethical. None of the studies referred to in this essay addresses the question of
the lawyer's role in the legal system; they all focus on the battleground between lawyer and client. But what of the lawyer's duty to the court and to the
world at large?
Part of the blame for the apparent lack of discussion about ethical standards among lawyers must be placed on the deplorable state of legal education in India. There are approximately 350 centers of legal education
throughout the country.4 2 These can be broken down into three categories:
(a) university departments of law, (b) state government-managed or -aided
colleges, and (c) proprietary colleges.4 3 While there is no official accreditation system, as there is in the United States under the aegis of the American
Bar Association, the Bar Council of India has tried to lay down standards defining the minimum criteria. It unfortunately does not have much power to
enforce them under the Advocates Act of 1961.
Many of the colleges, especially the proprietary ones, have little in the way
of facilities: Some have no buildings, no libraries, no full-time faculty, poorly structured syllabi, and inadequate monitoring of student standards. One
example will illustrate the difficulties. The southern state of Karnataka has
many privately run law colleges where there are no requirements for admission, and attendance at lectures is sparse. The neighboring states of Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh have competitive admission and a restricted number of student places. As a result many would-be lawyers flock
to the law colleges of Karnataka. 44 In other areas the instruction is carried out
in a mixture of English, Hindi, and local languages. Since the lingua franca
of the legal system is English, the likely problems can be easily imagined. Of
the 350 legal education centers in India, Menon estimates that 150 may be
able to meet the Bar Council's standards, while the remaining 200 are decidedly below par.
In the shadow of the poor state of legal education, the law colleges in the
Punjab shine brightly. Legal education there is highly regarded by the Bar
Council. All three law colleges in the Punjab are university departments. 6

41. Adopted by the House of Delegates, American Bar Association, Aug. 1983. See James Lindgren,
ed., Review Symposium: Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 A.B.F. Res. J. 921.
42. Menon, The Structure and Distribution of Law Colleges in India, in id., supra note 24, at 329.
43. Id. In (a) there are 50 centers, in (b) about 65, and in (c), 230.

44. Menon, Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, in id., supra note 24, at 307.

45. Menon, supra note 42, at 329. In (a)all would qualify, in (b) most would, and in (c) only 10% would
pass.
46. Id. at 330.
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About half of Gandhi's sample read law at Punjab University in Chandigarh, and almost a third graduated from Punjab University in Lahore

(now in Pakistan). The remainder attended other universities (at 66). Yet
despite the prestige of these centers and the legal ethics courses taught there,

Gandhi calls the Gobindgarh bar unprofessional.
It is difficult to select a theory to explain Gandhi's results; he simply does
not give us enough information to determine why the bar is lacking in professionalism.4 7 But, in a speculative vein, it does appear that the structural determinants of Indian life have a significant impact on the bar's profes-

sionalism. A largely rural-based society, riven by caste, only tenuously connected with the cities, must exert a powerful influence, probably greater than
that of any ethical training.
Ethnography and Methodology
As a final note to this essay I will discuss some of the problems en-

countered in the ethnographic study of lawyers. Gandhi is clear about how he
tackled his research: he knew the area, he knew some lawyers, and he "hung
out" at the courts. 48 He interviewed, he observed, and he eavesdropped.
Gandhi is also clear about his obstacles; for example, the munshis would not

let him look at their records, which were jealously guarded.
If researchers are to study the dynamics of legal practice and lawyering,
they must be able to observe all aspects of both the legal and quasi-legal
dramas unfolding around them. Invariably this raises the question of breach-

ing the confidentiality of the lawyer-client privilege. The invocation of this
shibboleth is frequently used to justify refusals to researchers. 4 9 But such obstacles are not indefeasible: Hosticka and Katz have studied poor people's
lawyers and their clients; 50 and Cain and I have analyzed English solicitor-

client relations. 5' Moreover, Heinz has argued persuasively that research into
lawyer-client relations can be carried out without breaching the lawyer-client
privilege. 2 If the researcher can be incorporated within that privilege by, for

47. Cf. Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular
Paradox, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 247.
48. There is one very serious error that gallops, rather than creeps, into his text. Gandhi chose the name
Gobindgarh to protect the anonymity of the town and its lawyers. Unfortunately, he then provides us with
sufficient geographical information that anyone with an atlas open to India can easily identify Gobindgarh. If promises of confidentiality or anonymity are given, they must, for the sake of the subjects and
other researchers, be honored and kept.
49. See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1974); Brenda Danet, Kenneth B. Hoffman, & Nicole C. Kermish, Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction: The Biography of a Failure, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 905 (1980).
50. Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going To
Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. Probs. 599 (1979); and Jack Katz, Poor People's
Lawyers in Transition (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1982).
51. Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical Conception, in
Robert Dingwall & Phillip Lewis, eds., The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); John A. Flood, Provincial Solicitors and Their Clients (typescript
1984).
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example, working as a part-time associate for a law firm, then the sufficiently
sensitive researcher should be able to produce findings without identifying
particular clients." Thus far, however, we are still in the realm of speculation.
Related to method is the matter of theory. Gandhi's study is permeated
with the theories of Talcott Parsons, especially when he writes about the degree of professionalism of Gobindgarh lawyers (at ch. 2). Ethnographic research, by its very nature, demands that researchers be acutely aware of all
that happens around them. Any kind of blinders are regrettable because they
will distort or restrict the view. So, how are researchers to analyze and present their findings? One school of thought advocates the application of
"grounded theory"; that is, the framework will emerge from the data over
time .5 The circumstances and context will determine the choice of theory.
Those who prematurely start with a theory in mind can find themselves in the
awkward position of having to abandon it, or they may force their data into
an incompatible theoretical framework. 5 This last point is graphically
demonstrated by Robin Luckham's experience in his research on Ghanaian
lawyers. He, too, adopted Parson's model of professionalism as his working
theory. As he pursued his studies, that theory became increasingly irrelevant,
for he could make no sense of his data. Ultimately, Luckham realized that
the structure of the Ghanaian legal profession was largely determined by the
levels of cocoa production and exports. As a result, he6 discovered a Marxist
model explained more than the theories of Parsons.1
Unfortunately, Gandhi does not indicate that he undertook such a process
of self-inquiry as to the relevance and validity of his chosen theories.57 This is
strange considering the extensive historical background he gives his subject.
With that kind of background I would think Gandhi would have wanted to
explain his data in relation to his cultural milieu, not that of Parsons. (The alternative would have been to make his study explicitly comparative.) No one,

53. This process, by the very nature of the enterprise, will be an interesting one to study as the final product-article or book-will emerge out of the collaborative efforts between law firm and researcher.
54. See Barney Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967); Howard S. Becker, Problems of Inference and Proof
in Participant Observation, 23 Am. Soc. Rev. 652 (1958).
55. See Robin Luckham, The Ghana Legal Profession: The Natural History of a Research Project, in
id., ed., Law and Social Enquiry: Case Studies of Research (New York: International Center for Law in
Development, and Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1981); and John A.
Flood, Middlemen of the Law: An Ethnographic Inquiry into the English Legal Profession, 1981 A.B.F.
Res. J. 377.
56. Luckham, supra note 55, at 127.
57. Gandhi could have discussed Terence Johnson's work on Third World professions. See, e.g.,
Terence J. Johnson, Imperialism and the Professions: Notes on the Development of Professional Occupations in Britain's Colonies and the New States, in Paul Halmos, ed., Professionalisation and Social
Change 287, Monograph no. 20 (Keele, England: Sociological Review, 1973); also Robin Luckham, The
Political Economy of Legal Professions: Towards a Framework for Comparison, in C. J. Dias et al., eds.,
Lawyers in the Third World: Comparative and Developmental Perspectives 287 (Uppsala, Sweden: Scan-

dinavian Institute of African Studies, and New York: International Center for Law in Development,
1981).
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at least to my knowledge, in the sociology of law has produced a theory that
transcends both history and culture. Gandhi's problem is that he has many
parts of the jigsaw puzzle, but he is unsure how to piece them together and
thereby detect what is lacking. And so we see this lopsided picture of an occupation that once had strong ties to the British bar, but now has only tenuous
ones at best. If Gandhi had seriously wanted to incorporate his study into the
theory-of-professions corpus, it would have been useful to show the relationship of lawyers to other occupations and to the state. For example, how significant is the role of the lawyer in Indian society? Is it central or peripheral?
Since India can be counted as a developing country, what is the role of lawyers in the development? Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that Gandhi
wrote the wrong book. We need detailed ethnographies like his but, taking
note of his theoretical and comparative historical context spelled out in the
early part of the book, he did not adumbrate the steps between the different
levels of abstraction he was trying to achieve.
Coda
At the time of writing this essay, I considered the topic of Indian lawyers a
remote and peripheral one to American lawyers' interests. Recent events
have changed my view. With the catastrophe caused by the massive emission
of methyl isocyanate gas from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in
early December 1984, the activities of American and Indian lawyers have
catapulted the topic from the periphery to the center.
I lamented the lack of ethical standards among Gandhi's Gobindgarh lawyers, but the unsavory sight of American ambulance chasers scrabbling
around the disaster dramatically outweighs the Indians' attempts at touting.
That the American laissez-faire attitude toward the prosecution of tort
claims might not be the most efficacious method of providing relief for the
victims does not appear to have deterred the American lawyers from signing
up thousands of potential clients to years of litigation in the American
courts. 8 The converse is that if the victims had to depend solely on the Indian
legal system, they would probably fare much worse, as the plaintiffs have to
pay significant court filing fees and no contingent fees are allowed to Indian
lawyers. The solution, of course, would be some form of social insurance.
Nevertheless, the Bhopal catastrophe has spawned an interesting collaboration between Indian and American lawyers. The role of the Indian lawyers
has largely been to act as touts for the Americans. A case in point is that of
John Coale, a Washington, D.C., solo practitioner who arrived in Bhopal
four days after the pesticide leak.5 9 Coale was brought into contact with the

58. This view is evocatively epitomized by two books: Gerry Spence& Anthony Polk, Gunning for Justice (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), and Stuart M. Speiser, Lawsuit (New York: Horizon Press,
1980). Both authors see themselves as the saviors of the oppressed, without worrying that the price of entry

to the lawyers' chambers might be prohibitively high for most people.
59. See Stephen J. Adler, Bhopal Journal: The Voiceless Victims, Am. Law., Apr. 1985, at 133.
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victims by a series of intermediaries starting with S. C. Godha, a Bhopal lawyer. The two lawyers, Coale and Godha, devised a retainer form in Hindi and
English and then sent out scouts to collect signatures. Coale gathered up to
68,000 signatures-other lawyers have collected anywhere from 1,200 to
now approximately 60 American lawyers represent60,000 clients. There are
60
plaintiffs.
Bhopal
ing
One conclusion drawn from research on the Indian legal profession is that
the participation of the tout is both normal and routine. And Gandhi's study
shows that lawyers themselves often adopt this role, with junior lawyers acting as touts for more senior ones (at 116-18). What is presented here in the
context of the Bhopal disaster is an instance of cross-national touting where
the American lawyers are playing the role of senior counsel.
What does this say for the lawyer-client relationship? Probably not much.
Whereas the lawyer-client relationship is mediated by touts and munshis in
India, this mediation occurs in a social context that does not entirely isolate
the clients from the lawyer. The context is understood within the culture; it
has its own set of rationales for the actors. Touting across continents, however, between mutually inconsistent social systems renders the meaning of a
lawyer-client relationship vacuous. The idea of a relationship being called into existence is meaningless where lawyers are dealing with thousands of
clients in this fashion.
Moreover, the American lawyers are in flagrant breach of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 6' The comment to Rule 7.2 on advertising
explicitly forbids lawyers' paying others "for channeling professional
work." Rule 7.3 on personal contact with prospective clients further circumscribes the extent to which lawyers can attempt to solicit clients. And Rule 8.4
on misconduct decries lawyers' violations, attempts at violation, or their
condoning the misconduct of others. Even the law firm representing the Indian government-Robins, Zelle, Larson and Kaplan of Minneapolis-has a
possible conflict of interest because it has counseled one of Union Carbide's
insurance companies. 62 A partial solution to the spreading morass has been
found by Judge John F. Keenan of the Southern District of New York, who
has appointed a committee of three plaintiffs' lawyers, including one representing the Indian government, to coordinate the pending litigation.6"
For the sociology of law, then, the Bhopal disaster has the potential for
generating studies in a variety of areas (e.g., lawyers' networks, legal ethics,
corporate behavior) and for developing comparative theories and methodologies that take account of an increasingly interdependent world.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 135.
Seesupranote4l.
See Kings of Catastrophe, Time, Apr. 22, 1985, at 80.
See Tamar Lewin, Three Lawyers to Oversee India Suits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1985, at 28, col. 3.
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APPENDIX
Glossary of Terms
Readers may refer to the following glossary for definitions of the various terms
used to describe the category lawyer.
Attorney: a legally qualified person who conducted all legal matters for clients except the pleading and argument in court. The title attorney was abolished in
England by the Judicature Acts of 1873-75, and attorneys were incorporated into
the group called solicitors(q.v.); also the term for a lawyer in the United States.
Advocate: a generic term for one who pleads the cause of another in court. More
particularly, in India it has been the standard term for a lawyer since the Advocates Act of 1961; and it is also the title of the Scottish equivalent of an English
barrister (q.v.).
Barrister:the English name for a lawyer who argues the cause of another in court.
Barristers do not receive their instructions from the client directly (which is in
most part forbidden), but from the solicitor (q.v.) hired by the client.
Inns of Court: the four unincorporated associations-Inner Temple, Middle Temple, Lincoln's Inn, and Gray's Inn-responsible for calling students to the bar
and maintaining chambers (suites of offices) for barristers (q.v.). They were
founded approximately at the beginning of the fourteenth century.
Solicitor: the current term for an attorney (q.v.). Solicitors originated as agents
within the chancery courts parallel to attorneys in the common law courts. Today
they are supervised by the Law Society, the solicitors' equivalent of the Inns of
Court (q.v.).
Vakil: the Indian term for a native pleader (until 1961)-one who had not trained in
Great Britain and therefore could not be a barrister (q.v.) or an advocate (q.v.).

